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This thesis explores methods and techniques for surveying 802.15.4 and Zig-
Bee wireless networks. The tools developed will aid in reconnaissance attacks
against target networks; information gathered during this process will be used
to profile a target network and its devices, as well as to pinpoint the geoloca-
tion of devices for executing physical attacks against the onboard hardware.
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1 Introduction
For the last decade or so, we have seen a proliferation of wireless technologies
such as WiFi, Bluetooth, WiMax, and Wireless USB, just to name a few.
Bluetooth, however, was the first to emerge as a WPAN (wireless personal
area network), a short-range wireless technology that allows devices in close
proximity of each other to exchange information [1]. The IEEE 802.15.1
specification subsequently emerged as a derivative standard of Bluetooth,
giving rise to the IEEE 802.15 working group specializing in WPAN stan-
dards, responsible for the IEEE 802.15.4 standard subject of this thesis. The
802.15.4 standard defines the PHY and MAC sublayer specifications for LR-
WPAN, aimed at low-rate, low-power, low-complexity, and low-cost wireless
connectivity [2].
1.1 What is ZigBee?
ZigBee is a wireless communications standard that uses 802.15.4 as a basis
for the PHY and MAC layers, while providing network functionality and an
application framework at the higher layers [3]. ZigBee reinforces the low-
rate and low-power characteristics of 802.15.4, and extends it by providing
networking, routing, reliability, security, and a variety of application profiles
for inter-operability between different vendor implementations [4].
1.2 How is ZigBee used?
The use of 802.15.4 and ZigBee in the home automation, industrial control,
health care, and other industries is proliferating. CenterPoint Energy selected
Itron as its smart meter provider in 2008, which provided smart meters with
built-in ZigBee radio chips for a “built-in communications pathway into the
home for data presentation, load control and demand response” [5]. Gov-
ernment stimulus and mandates have also pushed public utility companies
towards the adoption of 802.15.4 and ZigBee for their smart energy needs
[6]. In the home automation market, Yale, a leading lock manufacturer, has
slated a 2011 product launch of “smart” deadbolts for integration into home
security and automation systems such as those offered by Control4, a leading
home automation solutions provider which also uses ZigBee in some of its
products [7]. In the industrial and commercial setting, 802.15.4 is being used
for remote control and monitoring, usually as an extension or for integra-
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tion into existing SCADA1 or BACnet2 systems. At Dartmouth College for
example, manual meter reading has been discontinued in favor of a wireless
metering network that makes use of wireless sensors and repeaters/routers
utilizing 802.15.4, for metering condensate, chilled water, and electricity us-
age as part of the campus energy management system [8]. The switch to
wireless metering by the College was partly funded by a grant from the State
of New Hampshire Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction Fund [9], which is
an example of how state mandates and funding are helping to encourage the
adoption of smart metering technologies such as 802.15.4 and ZigBee.
1.3 Problem Statement
ZigBee has yet to achieve widespread adoption, and thus the state of available
wireless tools for the assessment of 802.15.4 and ZigBee can be compared to
the early years of 802.11, which were dominated by a lack of available tools
for the assessment of 802.11 security. Now, fourteen years after the release
of 802.11a, one can find dozens if not hundreds of wireless tools and frame-
works available for the assessment of 802.11. A handful of these tools are now
regarded as the de facto standard when it comes to performing 802.11 wire-
less assessments, some of which include: Kismet, an 802.11 wireless network
detector, sniffer, and intrusion detection system[11]; Aircrack-ng, an 802.11
WEP and WPA-PSK key cracking program[12]; Airbase-ng, a multi-purpose
tool aimed at attacking wireless clients[13]; and Airpwn, a framework for
802.11 packet injection[14]. Currently no de facto standard exists for per-
forming 802.15.4 and ZigBee wireless assessments, except for KillerBee, which
is quickly taking the lead as the tool of choice for exploring and performing
assessments of 802.15.4 and ZigBee networks and security research. Addi-
tionally, available commercial tools are expensive, which limits their use to
vendors whose primary concern may not be the security of their products,
and who typically use these tools for debugging protocol implementations
rather than for security assessments. As ZigBee continues to gain momen-
tum, it is important that free and open-source tools be available for surveying
and evaluating the security of 802.15.4 and ZigBee wireless networks, which
is one of the things that this thesis aims to improve, by lowering the barrier
of entry for all types of operations with a limited budget for self-assessment
and security research.
1Supervisory control and data acquisition system
2Data communications standard for building automation and control networks
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Why is it important? Developing surveying tools and evaluating the
security of the ZigBee wireless protocol is important, as ZigBee touches the
kinetic framework3 of systems more so than other wireless technologies. Since
many ZigBee and 802.15.4 devices interface the physical environment to real-
world applications, this makes them an attractive target to malicious actors
bent on causing physical harm or disruption. Additionally, as ZigBee con-
tinuous to gain momentum, organizations are going to jump on the ZigBee
bandwagon without truly understanding or assessing the security of the tech-
nology they are adopting.
1.4 Structure of Thesis
Section 2 discusses the current state of ZigBee security research and tools.
Section 3 covers techniques and tools developed for surveying 802.15.4 and
ZigBee wireless networks. Section 4 discusses the exploitation of ZigBee
security, by breaking confidentiality and attacking the link layer. Finally, a
summary and conclusion is presented at the end.
3Physical manipulation or control of switches, valves, etc.
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2 State of the Art
While available ZigBee research and tools is sparse, there are a handful of
security researchers at the forefront of ZigBee security research who have
made their work and tools open-source and available.
KillerBee
Joshua Wright recently made available a Python-based framework code-
named KillerBee, aimed as an attack framework for exploiting 802.15.4 and
ZigBee security [15]. The KillerBee framework provides facilities for discov-
ering ZigBee networks, capturing and injecting traffic, as well as some rudi-
mentary device locationing. The goal of the project is to provide users with
a framework that can be extended and used as base for building other tools,
discovering weaknesses, and carrying out a variety of attacks. My extensions
and modifications to the KillerBee framework are discussed in Section 3.
Travis Goodspeed
Travis Goodspeed is best known for his work on attacking the software and
hardware cryptosystems of microcontrollers and ZigBee radios. He has devel-
oped techniques for the extraction of encryption keys from protected memory,
which coupled with Joshua’s KillerBee framework, can be used to decrypt
captured and encrypted traffic [16]. Travis also presented a PRNG vulnera-
bility in TI’s Z-Stack ZigBee implementation, which allowed for the remote
recovery of keys [17]. Travis is also the creator and maintainer of the Good-
FET, an open-source JTAG adapter, which can be used as an aid in key
extraction and for debugging live chips [18].
Others
Kevin Finisterre recently built a ZigBee wardriving rig consisting of 16 ZigBee
sniffing devices, whom I worked with on debugging USB bus issues when using
KillerBee. Other researchers in the academic setting have released papers
discussing theoretical attacks for sensor networks in general, with a focus on
other protocols such as 6LoWPAN, and therefore a lack in ZigBee specific
material. Furthermore, accompanying tools and software demoed or talked
about in academic papers have not been made open-source or easily available,
which is not in accordance with the aim of this thesis to address the lack of
freely available and open-source tools. The author made various attempts
at acquiring relevant software and code from various academic researchers
4
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to no avail. Additionally, academic researchers will continue to reinvent the
wheel over and over again until a de facto standard or easily available open-
source tool becomes available for exploring the attack surface, where the
attack surface represents the exposure or potential risk posed by both known
and unknown vulnerabilities or security flaws. Only then can the security of
802.15.4/ZigBee network be truly assessed and put through its paces.
Collaboration
I have been in touch with Joshua Wright, Travis Goodspeed, Michael Os-
smann, and Kevin Finisterre among other security researchers, and have
sought advice regarding certain aspects of this thesis, and additionally, have
been collaborating with them on several issues and goals by sharing informa-
tion, tools, and techniques. This collaboration has resulted in the merging
and integration of code developed as part of this thesis into open-source
projects. I have also been working jointly and in parallel with Ryan Speers
in developing tools and techniques for the practical exploration of 802.15.4
and ZigBee security.
5
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3 Identifying 802.15.4 and Zigbee Networks
and Devices
Identifying 802.15.4/ZigBee networks is of particular importance because of
the distributed nature and mesh topology of 802.15.4/ZigBee networks. Tra-
ditional wardriving methods are less effective when applied to 802.15.4/Zig-
Bee networks, because of the short-range and “quiet” nature of these de-
vices. One must therefore tailor traditional site surveying and wardriving
techniques for 802.15.4/ZigBee networks. This section will discuss improve-
ments to traditional techniques, and the importance of analyzing network
traffic and pinpointing the physical location of devices, as well as selection
of hardware.
3.1 Equipment
A variety of hardware equipment was acquired for the purposes of this the-
sis. Each one was evaluated and modified, both in terms of hardware and
software.
RZUSBstick The initial KillerBee framework provided support solely for
the RZUSBstick from ATMEL. Additionally, the RZUSBsticks acquired were
flashed with firmware provided by Joshua Wright, which adds injection ca-
pabilities. The RZUSB is an attractive hardware platform because of its low
cost ($40), sniffing/injection capabilities, and extended support from AT-
MEL, which provide extensive documentation and facilities for modifying
the device firmware, making it a flexible and hacker-friendly platform. The
internal PCB antenna, however, proved to be less than ideal for wardriving
during initial tests. I therefore researched and acquired other hardware plat-
forms with external antenna capabilities for capturing network and device
traffic from longer distances, an important capability to have when wardriv-
ing discreetly and from a vehicle for example.
ZENA Network Analyzer The ZENA Network Analyzer by Microchip
was designated solely as a sniffing platform for the purposes of this the-
sis. The closed nature of the software platform on the ZENA prevents
one from adding injection capabilities or making any modifications to the
firmware. The ZENA is therefore better suited for capturing and analyz-
ing network traffic. The ZENA was selected primarily for its external an-
tenna support, a capability which I had to enable by relocating a capacitor
6
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on the board to direct the trace coming from MRF24J40 radio to an ex-
ternal antenna trace, a feature that is not documented by Microchip and
which they failed to provide information about when responding to my in-
quiries regarding the capability over the phone. After relocating the ca-
pacitor, an RP-SMA PCB mount was soldered, allowing one to use an ex-
ternal and higher-gain RP-SMA antenna of choice, pictured in Figure 1.
Figure 1: ZENA modifications
After the hardware modifications
were made, RF tests using a direc-
tional Yagi antenna yielded signifi-
cant improvements in site surveying
and wardriving results.
I also developed a software driver
for the ZENA for use with the
KillerBee framework. Although
Joshua Wright had written some ba-
sic Python code to dump raw pack-
ets from the ZENA to a terminal
over serial, support for the ZENA
was not available in KillerBee. I
therefore used Joshua Wright’s code
as a starting point and incorporated
support for the ZENA into KillerBee, allowing one to use the KillerBee frame-
work and ZENA for long-range traffic capture.
Tmote I also evaluated the Tmote Sky hardware platform in the early
stages of the thesis. The Tmote Sky is an open-source mote platform con-
taining an MSP430 microcontroller and 802.15.4 compliant radio. I acquired
the Tmote Sky platform in large quantities from the Wireless Sensor Lab at
Dartmouth, which made the platform suitable for use as target devices and
networks in addition to using the device as a network and traffic analysis plat-
form. The Tmote Sky also provided the facility to solder an RP-SMA mount
for external antenna support, in much the same manner as the ZENA, and
therefore surpassed the ZENA as the network and traffic analysis platform
of choice.
To designate the Tmote as a sniffing platform, I developed code to sniff
traffic on a given channel and dump raw packets to the terminal over se-
rial. I initially used the TinyOS operating system and framework to develop
the sniffing application, which later proved to be a nuisance when trying to
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add more advanced functionality such as threading and client commands.
I therefore decided to abandon the use of the TinyOS framework. Fortu-
nately and after this decision was made, Travis Goodspeed ported a version
of the GoodFET project to the Tmote/ TelosB platform, providing sniffing
and injection capabilities using low level access to the hardware. I have also
contributed to the GoodFET project through testing and code development
of the GoodFET project since the introduction of the Tmote/TelosB port by
Goodspeed.
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3.2 Capturing and Analyzing Network Traffic
To analyze the security of ZigBee networks, the facilities for discovering net-
works and analyzing traffic must be in place. I therefore developed an all-
channel monitor application for integration with the KillerBee framework.
The need for an all-channel monitor came into being when attempting to
capture traffic and reverse engineer the operation of the Spinwave Wireless
Sensor Network devices in use by Dartmouth College’s Facilities Operations
and Management (FO&M), as part of the campus energy management sys-
tem. Spinwave devices were acquired with permission from an FO&M em-
ployee to build a test network in a lab environment, to avoid interfering with
the production sensor network in use by the College.
When attempting to capture traffic from the test Spinwave network, I no-
ticed that the same PANID of the target network would appear on different
channels, which is not standard 802.15.4/ZigBee behavior. After doing some
research, it was determined from the documentation that the Spinwave de-
vices use a proprietary channel-hopping algorithm that continuously switches
between the 4 best channels, from the available 16 IEEE 802.15.4 channels,
for reliability and interference avoidance in overlapping Bluetooth and 802.11
channels, since they share part of the 2.4 GHz spectrum[10].
3.2.1 OpenEar
OpenEar is a 16-channel monitor that draws on the KillerBee framework by
assigning a channel to each device attached, meaning that 16 devices are
required for simultaneous monitoring of all channels. OpenEar also extends
the KillerBee framework with user-space threading of the capture process,
so that a single program is able to initialize and shut down captures for
all channels at once. This differs from Kevin Finisterre’s efforts, since his
method of building an all-channel monitor involved scripting the start-up
of a single non-threaded process for each device and channel using a BASH
script. This also differs from Ryan Speer’s zbwardrive tool, whose purpose
is to efficiently allocate and use a limited number of devices for capturing
traffic at any given time in an area, where a small number of networks may
be present and where channel-hopping is not expected.
The OpenEar application therefore enumerates all of the attached de-
vices, assigns a channel number to each, initializes a packet capture file for
each channel and a database connection for logging information to a MySQL
server using a database schema designed and provided by Ryan Speers. Ad-
ditionally, I created a persistent in-terminal display for displaying real-time
9
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stats, which is an important feature for performing real-time analysis and
identifying “chatty” or saturated areas of service when wardriving or on site.
The OpenEar application proved to be useful when mapping and gathering
information about 802.15.4 wireless coverage on the Dartmouth Campus.
Figure 2: 802.15.4 packet plot
Threading an all-channel
capture process also al-
lows for the sharing of re-
sources between capture
processes, such as lo-
cation information from
an attached GPS device,
a feature which is dis-





a location estimation tool,
it is not enough for effi-
ciently locating devices,
as it simply acts as
an RSSI strength meter,
which has proven to be
an inefficient method for
locating devices in site
surveying and wardriving tests conducted. I therefore extended the Killer-
Bee framework by adding the ability to log location information along with
captured packets. To enable the logging of location information, I used
gpsd, an open-source daemon that takes data received from an attached
GPS device, and formats the GPS data into a JSON format and gives back
the GPS data over a local TCP/IP connection. This allows multiple ap-
plications to share and use a GPS device concurrently. This is necessary
as most GPS devices capable of outputting GPS data to a computer do
so over a serial connection, which cannot be shared or accessed by multi-
ple applications at once. Gpsd additionally provides a Python API, which
facilitates the integration of gpsd into the KillerBee framework, which is
also written in Python. The OpenEar application therefore starts a “lo-
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cation” thread in addition to the capture threads. The sole purpose of
the “location” thread is to continuously poll the gpsd daemon service and
update the current location (latitude, longitude, altitude), referenced each
time a packet is logged. Currently location information is logged to a
database only. Future work will therefore incorporate logging of location
data into the PCAP files as well by utilizing Johnny Cache’s PPI-Geolocation
standard, which uses per-packet information tags. Support for the PPI-
Geolocation standard has been worked into Wireshark, Scapy, and Kismet,
making it ideal for standardizing the logging of location information across
a variety of capture applications, rather than having to come up with a
non-standardized format of storing location information along with packets.
Figure 3: ArcMap spatial interpolation us-
ing the hotspot analysis tool
Logging location information
is important for post-analysis
and geolocationing. One can
use location information to iden-
tify saturated areas of service
or to pinpoint the exact loca-
tion of a device or network, in-
formation which can then be
used to profile a network and
for carrying out physical attacks
against the hardware (discussed
in the next section). Figure
2 shows a simple plot 802.15.4
traffic across the Dartmouth
Campus, where each circle repre-
sents a point where an 802.15.4
packet was logged. A more ad-
vanced geospatial analysis takes
into consideration the received
strength and grouping of pack-
ets by network or relationship. I
experimented with the use of GIS applications such as ArcMap for these pur-
poses, which provide the ability to perform advanced spatial interpolation,
an example of which is shown in Figure 3, which uses the hotspot analysis
interpolation tool in ArcMap to interpolate and estimate wireless coverage
across the campus based on the limited number of sample points and strength
readings taken. I have developed and written scripts for extracting location
data from the database and converting into the shapefile format, which is
a geospatial vector data format that can be imported into GIS applications
11
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such as ArcMap. The written csv2shp.py program takes in a csv file of the
the form “ID, latitude, longitude, RSSI”, where ID is either the name of
the network or device and RSSI is the received signal strength, and creates
a shapefile using the open-source GDAL (Geospatial Data Abstraction Li-
brary) framework, which includes Python bindings.
The importance of pinpointing the location of a device is discussed in the
next section.
12
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4 Attacking the Link Layer
For the purposes of evaluating 802.15.4/ZigBee security, I explored the devel-
opment of a tools and techniques that can used as a pivot for launching a va-
riety of attacks, primarily using the USRP (Universal Software Radio Periph-
eral) and GNURadio framework[20]. Specifically, I explored the means of at-
tacking the link layer, which handles physical access to the wireless medium,
by using RF (radio frequency) jamming techniques to intercept and corrupt
traffic. Furthermore, the application of location knowledge of the target is ap-
plied as a means of breaking confidentiality.
Figure 4: USRP2 and 2.4Ghz daughterboard
4.1 USRP
One of the other hardware
platforms that was used
during this thesis is the
USRP2 developed by Et-
tus Research. The USRP
is essentially an FPGA
with swappable daughter-
board cards that act as
the RF front end for the
device, pictured in Figure
4. Components typically
implemented in hardware,
such as amplifiers, demod-
ulators, etc., are instead
implemented in software.
This means that a minimal amount of data processing and filtering is ac-
tually performed on the USRP or FPGA itself. It is instead left up to the
host computer to perform filtering and digital signal processing, which will
generally have a significantly higher computing power than the FPGA. The
USRP is therefore a flexible platform which the operation of can be changed
easily and on the fly, since signal processing blocks are written and imple-
mented in software instead of hardware. This makes the USRP an RF Swiss
Army knife of sorts when coupled with an array of daughterboards cards
that enable the reception and transmission in anywhere from the 25 MHz to
5 GHz range with the appropriate daughterboard cards.
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802.15.4 on the USRP
The USRP2 and GNURadio framework were coupled with Leslie Choong’s
UCLA 802.15.4 framework[21], which is an implementation of the 802.15.4
specification using the GNURadio framework, for enabling the reception
and transmission of 802.15.4 traffic on the USRP. Originally written for the
USRP1, I ported the framework for use with the USRP2 and made modi-
fications to the framework to enable the ability to target and jam 802.15.4
packets, which is discussed in the next section.
4.2 Jamming
Figure 5: USRP2 Selective Jamming Architecture
Selective jamming is
the process of listen-
ing for a specific trans-
mission or packet and
disrupting it by trans-
mitting garbage or a
packet at the same
time. Although this
technique has been cov-
ered numerous times
by academic researchers
in the past[23], the
aim is to lower the bar-
rier of entry by imple-
menting the selective
jamming technique on
a platform that is commonly used by security researchers.
4.2.1 Why jam selectively?
Selective jamming differs from continuos jamming which is the more common
way of jamming. Selective jamming has two main advantages over continuos
jamming, the first being that the jammer is active for a less period of time
and therefore consumes less energy, which is important if you’re running off
batteries for example. Secondly, it allows the person doing the jamming to
operate covertly. It will not be obvious to the network operator or owner
that someone is jamming their network. The jamming transmission needs
to only be activated for a period for a short period of time after the target
14
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transmission or packet has been identified, long enough to flip a couple of bits
in the packet. This is useful because most spectrum analyzers are not going
to have a fine enough resolution to to see a microsecond or even millisecond
blip, unless by chance. This is because spectrum analyzers have to sweep the
frequency range, reporting what they say at each frequency along the way,
a process which can take a couple hundred milliseconds at best to sweep
across the entire range. I experienced this first hand when trying to debug
the selective jamming application on the USRP2 using the WiSpy, a USB
spectrum analyzer, which has a resolution to hundredths of a second.
4.2.2 What are some targets for selective jam?
Figure 6: Selectively Jammed ACK packet
Targets for selective jam-
ming include: ACKs,
jamming ACKs will cause
congestion on the net-
work because packets have
to be re-transmitted (Fig-
ure 6 shows an example
of a jammed ACK; associ-
ation responses, jamming
these will cause a denial
of service and power drain
on battery operated de-
vices since they cannot join the network and thus have to continuously retry
to join the network, an attack that the I carried out using the selective jam-
ming architecture developed for the USRP2.
4.2.3 Implementation
To implement selective jamming on the USRP2, I implemented a traffic recog-
nizer and jammer/transmitter component blocks into the UCLA framework.
Figure 5 shows the selective jamming architecture. The receiver and demod-
ulator components are provided/given by the UCLA framework, whereas the
traffic recognizer and transmitter components represent code written by me.
Given a mask to match against, the traffic recognizer reads the incoming
packet bytes one by one, comparing the bytes against the mask. Upon a
match, the transmitter is activated, which simply generates noise on the
given channel, although a random packet could be sent as well.
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4.2.4 Limitations
One limitation encountered while working with the USRP2 was being able to
analyze packets in real time so that the transmission can be disrupted before
it finishes transmitting. In all of the USRP2’s glory, the latency between
the USRP and host computer prevents one from jamming packets in real-
time or within the same frame. Despite this limitation, the USRP2 was able
to inference and jam particularly long sequences or exchanges, such as that
occurs when a device joins a network. Similarly, we one can check to see
if the ACK bit for a particular packet is set, and if so, will indicate that
an ACK is expected as the next packet, meaning that we can inference and
activate our jammer ahead of time.
The GNURadio and UCLA framework are also written in Python, which
is not necessarily ideal for real-time processing. One improvement that could
be made is to move the traffic recognizer component to the FPGA, so that
the FPGA is able to match a packet or transmission locally without having
the host computer to do the matching/parsing. Doing so requires modifying
the firmware on the FPGA, written in VHDL, for which I did not get a
chance to do due to time limitations.
This type of attack is therefore better suited either with modified FPGA
firmware or a microcontroller, as demonstrated by Ryan Speers reactive jam-
ming implementation on the Tmote, which was pursued after it became clear
that the USRP2 would simply not be fast enough for achieving a fast enough
turnaround for jamming.
16
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5 Breaking Confidentiality and Integrity
Direction finding in 802.15.4 and ZigBee networks is of particular impor-
tance because of the distributed nature and mesh topology of 802.15.4/Zig-
Bee networks. One of the attacks that one can carry with location infor-
mation is physical capture or tampering. Travis Goodspeed has done some
work on this, including the development of the GoodFET, which can be
used as an aid in key extraction. Pictured in Figure 7 is a production in-
home display (IDH) that I acquired and extracted keying information from,
which included certificates, in addition to firmware and encryptions keys.





measures in place for
protecting the mem-
ory. I was thus able
to extract certificate
and key information




from the device could
be used to forge the
identity of an IDH.
With physical cap-
ture one can also modify sensor inputs, either physically or in firmware,
by replacing the firmware on the device with custom firmware.
17
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5.1 Reverse Engineering the IDH
Figure 8: In-home display internals w/ shield
In the process of re-
verse engineering the
device, the first thing
to do was to look up
the FCC documenta-
tion for the device.
In typical FCC ven-
dor submission style,
the interesting parts
of the internal pho-
tos were blurred so
as to hide informa-
tion about the par-
ticular radio chip be-
ing used.
The next was there-
fore to open the IDH
and examine the hardware. Upon doing so, I discovered that the radio part
of the IDH had a shield soldered. Whether the purpose of the shield was
to shield the radio from RF interference or to provide some sort of physical
security remains unclear, in either case, I was able to desolder the shield after
15 minutes of work. Upon removing the shield, I discovered that the IDH
was using an off-the-shelf EM250 radio module, pictured in Figure 9.
Figure 9: In-home display internals w/o shield
After the type of
radio chip being used
was determined, the next
step was to lookup up
manufacturer documen-
tation to see how one




that the InSight USB
Link, a stand-alone USB
programmer for program-
ming the EM250 and
EM260 devices, would be
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sufficient for not only programming the device but also extracting memory
and dumping the radio chip’s firmware. Once the debugger was acquired,
I used Ember tools and software to dump the device firmware as a hex
file. To do this, the author connected the debugger to the SIF port of the
IDH, which provides and access to the entire flash and RAM memory space,
and used the EM2USBRead utility to dump the chip’s entire flash memory
using the following command: $ ./EM2USBRead.exe -Run -outfile
dump.hex. This command reads the entire chip’s flash contents, including
application data, boot loader, and manufacturing tokens, where information
such as certificates are typically placed, enabling easy access to security to-
kens such as private keys and certificates.
More specifically, four security components can be extracted from the
EM250. The first component is the device’s IEEE address and static public
key signed with the CA’s private key, and thus confidentiality is not sig-
nificantly impacted. The static private key on the other hand is generally
carefully guarded and treated as secret information, and significantly impacts
confidentiality. The CA public key corresponds to the secret private key held
by Certicom, and is used to authenticate other devices’ certificates and to val-
idate encryption keys generated using the Smart Energy Key Establishment
Cluster, and is also regarded as public information, and thus confidentiality
of the CA public key not of importance.
Although not necessarily a new or novel attack against the crypto system,
the capability to extract key information memory shows a disturbing trend,
where vendors either continue to remain ignorant or simply refuse to heed the
advice of security researchers. Additionally, the security token information
extracted from the device could be used to forge the identity of another
device, which impacts integrity. In the case of the EM250, the EM260 would
be better suited as it provides better protection through the use of security
fuses to prevent the dumping of memory, although security may only be
marginally better, as Travis Goodspeed has found ways of getting around
security fuses on other radio chips and microcontrollers[22].
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6 Conclusion
This thesis has covered the use of a range of tools, all of which have either
been incorporated into the KillerBee framework or released individually as
open-source code. Most of the research presented in this thesis was also pre-
sented at ShmooCon 2011 Washington, D.C. , where presented work garnered
interest from various members in the security research community, many of
which got in contact with the author shortly after the ShmooCon presenta-
tion. Other security researchers have thus been in contact to collaborate and
pursue their own security research using the tools developed as part of this
thesis.
Many different areas of research were touched upon as part of this thesis,
everything from sniffing and carrying attacks using the highly customizable
USRP2 and GNURadio framework, to locating and ultimately acquiring de-
vices for physical extraction of information. Additionally, all research and
tools have been made publicly available at: http://www.cs.dartmouth.
edu/˜melgares/zigbee/.
After spending some time working on researching and working on this
thesis, it became clear to the author that much remains to be learned about
802.15.4/ZigBee security research, and that the state of 802.15.4/ZigBee se-
curity research and tools is evolving. It will therefore be interesting to see
what new tools and research are released in the future.
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